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Abstract 
What explains citizens’ willingness to fight for their country in times of war? Using six 
waves of the World Values Survey, we find that individual willingness to fight is 
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negatively related to country-level income inequality. When income inequality is high, 
the rich are less willing to fight than the poor. When inequality is low, the poor and the 
rich do not differ much in their willingness to fight. The change in the willingness to fight 
between low and high inequality is greater among the rich than among the poor. We 
explore several explanations for these findings. The data are consistent with the argument 
that high inequality makes it more attractive for the rich to buy themselves out of military 
service.   
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 3 
Citizens’ willingness to fight for their country affects governments’ decisions to go to 
war and, once a conflict has started, a country’s performance on the battlefield.2 What, 
then, explains citizens’ willingness to fight for their country in times of war? While high-
profile traumatic events, such as the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 or the 
9/11 attacks on New York, can propel people to sign up and protect their country,
3
 
relatively little is known about people’s willingness to serve. Below, we explore some of 
the more enduring and material, rather than short-term or affective, determinants of 
individual willingness to fight for one’s country. Specifically, we focus on how 
individual income and country-level income inequality jointly relate to the willingness to 
fight.  
Using data from six waves of the World Values Survey
4
 with over 100,000 
respondents from more than 90 countries, we provide the most comprehensive analysis of 
the link between income, income inequality, and people’s willingness to fight that has 
been conducted to date. We find that respondents from countries where income is more 
evenly distributed are more willing to fight for their country than respondents from high-
inequality countries. Furthermore, there is no direct relationship between individual 
income and willingness to fight. Rather, the association between willingness to fight and 
respondents’ income depends on a country’s level of income inequality: when income 
inequality is high, higher income individuals are less willing to fight for their country 
than their lower income compatriots. When inequality is low, differences in the 
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willingness to fight between better-off and less well-off citizens are modest and 
substantially smaller than the differences between rich and poor in high-inequality 
settings. Thus, people at the opposite ends of the income spectrum differ in their 
willingness to fight for their country only when income inequality is high. Finally, our 
analyses indicate that differences between the rich in high versus low inequality settings 
are more pronounced than differences between the poor in high and low inequality 
settings, suggesting that it is willingness to fight on the part of the rich rather than the 
poor that is chiefly affected by inequality. 
We examine several potential explanations for these findings, including 
arguments based on mobilization costs, nationalism, redistribution concerns, and capital 
intensity. Our results show the mobilization cost account to be most consistent with the 
data, especially with respect to the very rich in countries where inequality is most 
pronounced. More precisely, under such conditions better-off individuals can effectively 
"buy themselves out of service" by paying their poorer compatriots to serve rather than 
doing so themselves. Meanwhile, as noted, the poor in high-inequality countries do not 
differ much from the poor in low-inequality settings in their willingness to fight, as 
would be expected if only opportunity costs are considered.  
This paper makes several contributions. First, we provide insights into the 
country-level and individual-level foundations of war-related attitudes that are central to 
states’ ability to mobilize their populations and to their performance in the battlefield. 
Second, our findings suggest that, in addition to factors such as feelings of patriotism, 
individuals' backgrounds (e.g. gender, age), or the country's history of military conflict, 
material considerations are important drivers of citizens’ willingness to fight, especially 
 5 
when it comes to wealthier individuals. Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on 
the link between income inequality and conflict by examining the role of economic 
factors in shaping attitudes about wartime behavior.  
Income, Inequality, and Willingness to Fight 
In recent years, social scientists have begun to explore why people are willing to 
fight for their country. For example, studies have shown that demographic and attitudinal 
factors matter – for instance, women, older people, divorced individuals, and the 
unemployed have been found to be less willing to fight, and education does not appear to 
be a strong predictor of the inclination to serve.
5
 Perhaps not surprisingly, attitudes such 
as national pride, confidence in the army, and support for an authoritarian regime are 
positively correlated with the willingness to fight.
6
 Country-level factors are also at work: 
willingness to fight is higher in the Nordic countries and lower in enduring democracies 
and countries that were on the losing side in World War II.
7
 Current politics and policies 
matter, too, as a country’s entanglement in ongoing conflicts8 and having a conscription 
army
9
 have also been linked with individual motivation to fight for one’s country.  
While undoubtedly important, one issue this previous research has yet to address 
is whether and how economic considerations and circumstances shape the willingness to 
fight. Our article tries to fill this gap by focusing on two prominent variables – individual 
income and country-level disparities in how income is distributed. We focus on 
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inequality because the economic foundations of war have long been of interest to political 
scientists. The literature on war assumes that war is costly because it requires inputs of 
economic resources and labor.10 A large strand in this literature suggests that 
these costs are not spread equally among individuals. Esteban and Ray show 
that at times of war, wealthier individuals choose to provide economic resources 
rather than labor because their market income exceeds what they can potentially 
earn through military service.11 Poorer individuals, however, choose to contribute 
their labor because their market income is lower than their expected 
compensation for serving. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence in support of this 
opportunity-cost-based logic. Military service often offers clear material 
advantages like a steady income, along with a means of acquiring human capital 
through education and technical training. The latter can lead to more satisfying 
and higher-paying careers after military service, particularly for minorities and 
marginalized groups.12 In some cases, military service even provides a path to 
acquiring political and legal rights, citizenship, and national integration for 
marginalized groups.13  
All told, the poor may feel that they have little to lose and much to gain 
from military service, and there is ample evidence that combatants are often 
recruited from the poorer segments of society.14 Likewise, rich individuals often 
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have legal means of buying themselves out of military service.15 While some 
studies have questioned the empirical validity of the opportunity cost argument,16 
we would expect a negative relationship between individual income and 
willingness to fight for one’s country.  
Other studies suggest that the distribution of income in society, measured at the 
country level, may affect citizens’ willingness to fight for their country. A large body of 
work suggests that income disparities beget intolerance, reduce civic participation, 
weaken interpersonal trust and satisfaction with the political system, and shape attitudes 
about gender equality.
17
 Economic disparities have also been viewed as drivers of within-
state instability.
18
 Thus, if inequality reduces within-state cohesion, it may be associated 
with a lower willingness of citizens to fight for their country. Inequality, however, may 
also have the opposite effect, at least among some. Solt, for example, provides evidence 
that income disparities are positively related to nationalistic sentiments.
19
 Given that 
national pride is positively correlated with willingness to fight in times of war,
20
 
inequality may increase willingness to fight for one’s country, to the extent that it 
increases nationalism. Whether income inequality enhances or diminishes people’s 
willingness to fight is an open empirical question at this time. 
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There is some suggestive evidence that it does. Using the WVS data, Inglehart, 
Puranen, and Welzel report that members of wealthier societies may have less 
willingness to fight because they view their lives – and the value of their lives – in very 
different ways compared to members of poorer societies.
21
 More specifically, improved 
living conditions bring fundamental shifts in people’s beliefs and values, most notably 
their readiness to sacrifice their lives. Building on this “opportunity–value link” (whereby 
subjective human values are linked to objective life opportunities), they demonstrate that 
the publics of developed societies have become more supportive of 
“emancipative/postmaterialist values” while their willingness to fight in war has declined.  
Our study extends Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel’s thesis in several ways. First, 
while they highlight the role of “life opportunities” – a composite country-level measure 
that includes, among other things, the inverted Gini index – in explaining willingness to 
fight, our measures imply an important independent impact of income inequality. In fact, 
the economic explanation in their study receives relatively little empirical attention. Not 
only is the Gini index only one of six multi-component indicators of “life opportunities”, 
its low factor loading (0.56) (the lowest of the six items in the index) suggests that it 
captures a separate empirical and, we believe theoretical, dimension. Second, we examine 
how individual income and country-level income inequality jointly shape individual 
willingness to fight, whereas Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel do not examine individual 
income. In the present paper, we explore the economic explanation more deeply, notably 
the interactive effect of individual income and country-level disparities on willingness to 
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fight, thereby focusing on a different set of hypotheses than those tested by Inglehart, 
Puranen, and Welzel. 
Beyond the additive impact of individual and country-level economic drivers of 
willingness to fight, some research has sought to connect individual-level income and 
country-level inequality by suggesting that the two interact to affect willingness to fight 
for one’s country. This scholarship offers four main mechanisms for this interaction. 
First, according to Shayo,
22
 inequality increases nationalism among the poor for whom 
identification with the nation offers higher-status than their economic identity. To the 
extent that nationalism is correlated with willingness to fight, we may therefore expect 
that when inequality is high, the poor should be more willing to fight for their country 
than the rich. This logic implies that there may not be substantial differences between 
different economic strata when income inequality is low.  
A second proposed mechanism for a conditional effect of income and inequality 
on willingness to fight focuses on mobilization costs. Esteban and Ray suggest that 
inequality lowers both the financial and the human opportunity cost of conflict.
23
 Thus, 
when inequality is high it becomes cheaper for the rich to pay the poor to take on the 
burden of military service. High inequality also makes it more attractive for the poor to 
fight in exchange for benefits. Kuhn and Weidmann empirically show that greater income 
disparities within an ethnic group make ethnic conflict more likely because they make 
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mobilizing the poor cheaper, and the rich have more resources to spare for mobilization.
24
 
Applying this logic to the country level suggests that greater inequality makes it cheaper 
for the rich to buy themselves out of service because poor individuals are willing to serve. 
This view also implies that we should not expect big differences between the poor and 
the rich when inequality is low.  
A third proposed mechanism based on Scheve and Stasavage, holds that wars that 
require full mobilization increase support for redistribution and progressive taxation.
25
 
This implies that when initial inequality is high, demands for redistribution are greater 
than when inequality is low. Thus, anticipating future demands for higher taxation, the 
rich in high-inequality countries may be less willing to serve than the poor (and less 
willing to support war altogether), knowing that they will face higher taxation. In low-
inequality countries, people at both ends of the spectrum should be relatively similar in 
their willingness to fight because low inequality means that taxation and redistribution 
are not expected to increase by much in the event of a war.  
Finally, focusing on democracies, Caverley suggests that poorer individuals in 
high inequality contexts may be more willing to fight for their country because the capital 
intensity of their militaries reduces the likelihood that they will have to sacrifice their 
lives.
26
 Meanwhile, the rich in democracies should be less willing to fight for their 
country if inequality is high because they will bear a disproportionate share of the 
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economic costs of war. This explanation also implies that as inequality goes down, we 
should observe fewer differences between the rich and the poor in their willingness to 
fight. 
To sum up, the literature implies that socio-economic position is likely to be a 
strong determinant of individual willingness to fight for one's country at times of war. 
Individuals are more likely to express the willingness to join up if they expect to receive 
selective economic incentives that outweigh any benefits of not joining.
27
 However, we 
should be cautious about the simplistic conclusion that low income alone is a sufficient 
trigger for military service at times of war. We propose that while low income is a 
motivating factor, its effect is conditional on the unequal distribution of income. 
Taken together, the existing theorizing and evidence suggests four empirically 
testable hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to fight is lower in high inequality countries. 
Hypothesis 2: In general, willingness to fight is lower among the rich than among the 
poor. 
Hypothesis 3: In high inequality countries, willingness to fight is lower among the rich 
than among the poor.  
Hypothesis 4: There are no major differences between the poor and the rich when 
inequality is low.  
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It should be noted that, for any given individual, willingness to fight may be 
moderated by the associated risk of actually having to do so.  The most obvious variables 
that may affect these odds are gender and age, with young males between the ages of 18 
and 45 much more likely to experience conscription in times of war than women. 
 
Data and Empirical Method 
This section outlines the model and the data we use for the empirical analysis. Additional 
description of the data is in the Appendix. The unit of analysis is individual, based on 
responses to the World Value Surveys waves 1 through 6 (the list of countries and years 
is in Table A.1 in the Appendix).
28
  
Our basic specification is designed to estimate the effect of individual-level 
income and country-level inequality on the probability of an affirmative answer to the 
WVS willingness to fight for their country question, controlling for individual- and 
country-level variables that may affect this answer.29 Formally, we estimate 
different versions of the following probit model: 
Pr(𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 1 | 𝑸𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒁𝑖, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝑿𝑖, 𝑿𝑗,𝑡−1, 𝜆𝑗 , 𝛾𝑡)
= 𝐺(𝑸𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒁𝑖 + 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑸𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒁𝑖 ×  𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑿𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝜆𝑗 + 𝛾𝑡) 
                                                          
28
 WVS 1981-2014. 
29
 The wording of the question is: “Of course we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to 
come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” The possible answers are “yes” and “no”. 
This question appears in all the six waves of the survey, but not in all country-years.  
 13 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 equals 1 if respondent 𝑖 from country 𝑗 in 
survey 𝑡 replies “yes” to the WVS question about willingness to fight, and it equals 0 
if the answer is “no”. The distribution of answers to this question is Figure 1. There is a 
high degree of heterogeneity among countries, with the percent of affirmative answers 
ranging from 26 per cent in Japan to 98 per cent in Vietnam. The median percent of 
missing values per country-year in the Willingness to Fight question is 12 per cent, and 
the mean is 20 per cent.
30
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high share of missing values. 
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Figure 1: Willingness to Fight 
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𝑸𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒁𝑖 is a vector of respondent 𝑖’s five income group fixed effects, 
with 𝒁 denoting income quintile.31 These variables are based on the WVS 
question that asks respondents to indicate their income group on a scale from one 
(lowest income group) to ten (highest income group). We convert these self-reported 
income deciles into five quintiles, and include five binary indicators of income quintiles. 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 is country-level income inequality measure based on the Net Gini variable from 
the Standardized World Income Inequality Dataset, SWIID.
32
 We interact each indicator 
of 𝑸𝒖𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒁𝑖 with 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 to examine whether country-level inequality affects 
the relationship between income quintile and willingness to fight.  
𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of individual-level predictors taken from the WVS surveys. 
We include indicators for gender (𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖), age and age squared (𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑖and 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖
2), three 
fixed effects for marital status (𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝑖, 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑/𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖 , and 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑/
𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖), and an indicator for whether the respondent listed a religious 
denomination. We use this variable to control for religiosity, although there may be 
secular individuals who nonetheless name a religious affiliation. In the Appendix, we also 
report results of tests that include additional control variables such as education and being 
a member of a minority group, and attitudinal controls such as confidence in government 
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16 
and in the army, and feelings of national pride. Suffice it to say that inclusion of these 
controls does not change our main results. 
𝑿𝑗,𝑡−1 is a vector of country-level time-varying characteristics. In this 
vector, we include 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1(log) and 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1(log) using data from the Penn 
World Tables version 7.1.
33
 We also control for the type of political regime. Figure 1 
suggests that democratic countries tend to have lower levels of willingness to fight than 
less democratic countries (although there are outliers, such as Sweden and Norway that 
rank high on the willingness to fight). We control for regime type by including a variable 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1 that ranges from zero (full autocracy) to one (full democracy), and is 
based on democracy and autocracy scores from Polity IV.
34
 Additionally, we control for 
country’s prior involvement in conflict in any of the five years that precede the survey 
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡5𝑗,𝑡−1). The data on conflict are from MID 4.0 and UCPD/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset v.4-2014.
35
 In addition, we include an indicator 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 that 
equals one if a respondent’s country has a conscription-based military.36 Finally, in some 
specifications reported in the Appendix, we control for country-level ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization measured in 1961 (𝐸𝐿𝐹61𝑗).
37
 Country-level controls are lagged.  
Summary statistics of individual-level and country-level variables are in the online 
appendix. 
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20
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37
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𝜆𝑗 is a country fixed effect that controls for time-invariant country-level 
factors, and we include it to reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias.38 𝛾𝑡 is 
a survey-wave fixed effect that absorbs time trends in responses to the 
willingness to fight question.39 In some specifications, we cluster the standard errors 
at the subnational geographic area, using information on the respondent’s subnational 
region of residence available for some surveys. Since in some cases responses from the 
same region may be correlated (for example, due to common ethnicity or past experience 
with conflict), we also report results adjusted for potential clustering within countries.   
 
Main Results 
Table 1 presents the coefficients of various specifications of the model. Here we report 
results for male respondents only. In the online appendix, we report results of the entire 
sample, as well as the coefficients of our various control variables. We focus on male 
respondents because females are not required to serve in the military in all the countries 
in our sample, with the exception of Israel. Thus, by answering this question, male 
respondents are asked to consider a situation in which they might find themselves under 
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 Country fixed effects absorb several factors that previous research finds to be correlated with responses 
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World War II (Puranen 2014; Inglehart et al. 2015). Instead of explicitly controlling for all these factors 
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18 
some conceivable circumstances. In all models, our baseline is quintile five (the 
wealthiest respondents). We use all the 100 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1 imputations.
40
 
  
                                                          
40
 We use the –mi estimate- prefix in Stata (Stata 2013). 
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Table 1: Main results 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Gini -1.765*** 
(0.374) 
-1.684*** 
(0.499) 
-2.53*** 
(0.40) 
-2.33*** 
(0.52) 
-2.57*** 
(0.79)  
Q1 0.000 
(0.020) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.44*** 
(0.08) 
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.37*** 
(0.10) 
Q2 0.010 
(0.019) 
0.041** 
(0.020) 
-0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
-0.23** 
(0.10) 
Q3 0.021 
(0.019) 
0.043** 
(0.020) 
-0.18** 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
Q4 0.021 
(0.020) 
0.042** 
(0.021) 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
Q1 × Gini   1.18*** 
(0.21) 
1.05*** 
(0.22) 
1.04*** 
(0.27) 
Q2 × Gini   0.84*** 
(0.20) 
0.64*** 
(0.21) 
0.700*** 
(0.26) 
Q3 × Gini   0.56*** 
(0.20) 
0.35 
(0.21) 
0.20 
(0.27) 
Q4 × Gini   0.59*** 
(0.21) 
0.45** 
(0.22) 
0.46* 
(0.25) 
Individual 
controls 
No  Yes No  Yes Yes 
Country 
controls 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
Country fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fe 
Clustered se                              
Yes 
No
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Constant 1.579 
(0.125) 
23.153*** 
(2.420) 
1.84*** 
(0.14) 
22.91*** 
(2.44) 
29.02*** 
(5.46) 
N                 
(countries) 
117,095 
(91) 
107,605 
(87) 
117,095 
(91) 
107,605 
(87) 
98,288 
(83) 
F 91.96 82.27 88.44 78.87 38.09 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p ≤ 0.1, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01 
 Notes: The unit of observation is individual. Q5 is the baseline. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. These results are based on male respondents only (full sample results are in 
the Appendix). Column (5) reports robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within 
country. The individual controls include a gender indicator, age, age squared, three 
marital status fixed effects, and an indicator for whether the respondent is listed a 
religious denomination. The country controls include log of population, log of GDP, 
democracy score, an indicator for whether the respondent’s country was involved in a 
conflict at some point within the five years prior to the survey, and an indicator for 
whether the respondent’s country has a conscription-based military. All results include 
country and survey fixed effects. 
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We start with a simple model, controlling only for country and survey fixed 
effects, and without interacting individual income and country income inequality. 
Column 1 suggests that inequality is negatively related to willingness to fight (Hypothesis 
1), but that individual income does not have a statistically significant relationship with 
willingness to fight (Hypothesis 2). When we add individual- and country-level time-
varying controls in column 2, inequality is still negatively associated with willingness to 
fight. The relationship between willingness to fight and income appears to be non-linear: 
it is higher in the middle of the income scale (quintiles 2, 3, and 4), with lower 
willingness among the poorest (quintile 1) and the wealthiest (quintile 5) respondents. In 
summary, while willingness to fight for one’s country is negatively associated with 
country-level inequality (in support of Hypothesis 1), there is no strong direct association 
with individual income (contrary to Hypothesis 2).  
Moving on with our tests, we interact income inequality with individual income to 
examine whether the effect of income on willingness to fight is conditional on income 
disparities. In column 3, we test a simple model without controls (we include only 
country and survey fixed effects), and in column 4 we add individual- and country-level 
time-varying controls. In column 5, we adjust standard errors for within-country 
clustering. In the Appendix, we show that the results are also robust to clustering at the 
country-level. The results suggest the negative relationship between inequality and 
willingness to fight holds here as well. Moreover, the coefficients of some quintiles and 
the interaction terms are statistically significant.  
Since the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted, in Table 2 we present the 
predicted probabilities of “yes” for each income quintile, holding net Gini at its minimum 
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(low inequality) and then at its maximum (high inequality), and keeping the other 
variables at their real values.
41
 These results are based on models with individual and 
country controls, as well as country and survey fixed effects, and clustered standard 
errors. They are the most conservative estimates – our findings are stronger for models 
with fewer controls. Figure 2 depicts the predicted probabilities for male respondents, by 
income and inequality level.  
 
                                                          
41
 To calculate predicted probabilities, we use the –mimrgns- command in Stata: 
https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457795.html, accessed April 3, 2017.  
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Table 2: Predicted probabilities of Willingness to Fight=”yes” based on Column 5 in Table 1  
 (1) 
Low Inequality 
(2) 
High Inequality 
 
 
Predicted 
Probability 
St. Err. p>|t| 95% CI Predicted 
Probability 
St. Err. p>|t| 95% CI 
Q1 0.846 0.026 0.000 [0.795  0.897] 0.694 0.053 0.000 [0.591  0.798] 
Q2 0.860  0.024 0.000 [0.813  0.906] 0.675 0.052 0.000 [0.572  0.778] 
Q3 0.872 0.022 0.000 [0.829  0.916] 0.648 0.054 0.000 [0.553  0.754] 
Q4 0.867  0.023 0.000 [0.822  0.913] 0.658 0.054 0.000 [0.553  0.764] 
Q5 0.874  0.023 0.000 [0.829  0.918] 0.612 0.057 0.000 [0.499  0.724]  
Notes: This table reports estimates for male respondents (predicted probabilities for the full sample are reported in the Appendix). We 
calculate predicted probabilities using the –mimrgns- command in Stata (Klein, 2014), setting net Gini at its minimum (low 
inequality) and at its maximum (high inequality), keeping the other variables at their real values.   
There are statistically significant (95%) differences between Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 in low inequality (0.846≠0.874, p=0.000) and 
in high inequality (0.694≠0.612, p=0.008).  
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities plot 
 
Predicted probabilities based on estimates in Column (5) in Table 2 (male respondents 
only, controlling for individual- and time-varying country-level factors, survey wave and 
country fixed effects, and adjusting standard errors for clustering). For each income 
quintile, the plot presents predicted probabilities of “yes”, and their 95% confidence 
interval, for low and high levels of inequality (net Gini set at minimum and at maximum, 
respectively).  
There is a statistically-significant difference between low and high inequality. Even for 
quintile 1, where the confidence intervals overlap, the point estimate is statistically 
significant (p=0.51).  
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In our interpretation of the predicted probabilities, we focus on comparing quintile 
1 and quintile 5 (the bottom 20 per cent and the top 20 per cent, respectively). Four 
results emerge: (1) high inequality is associated with a lower probability of an affirmative 
answer in all income quintiles. (2) in low inequality, the probability of “yes” is increasing 
modestly in income, whereas in high inequality it is decreasing in income. When 
inequality is low, the predicted probability of “yes” among poor male respondents is 
0.846, and it is 0.873 among wealthy male respondents (p=0.000). When inequality is 
high, the probability that a poor male respondent replies affirmatively is 0.694, and it is 
0.612 for a wealthy male respondent (p=0.008). (3) The substantive difference in the 
probability of an affirmative answer between Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 is bigger when 
income inequality is high than when it is low (consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 4). When 
inequality is low, the poor are only 2.8 percentage points less likely to answer “yes” than 
the wealthy, and when inequality is high, they are 8.2 percentage points more likely to 
reply “yes” than wealthy respondents. Finally, (4) the change among the rich is greater 
than the change among the poor when we move from low to high inequality.
42
  
In sum, our findings suggest that willingness to fight is decreasing in inequality; 
that it does not have a direct relationship to individual income; that the rich are less 
willing to fight for their country than the poor when income inequality is high, and that 
the rich are slightly more willing to fight than the poor when inequality is low, though the 
                                                          
42
 We look at the difference between willingness to fight in low and high inequality among the poor and the 
rich, and calculate the difference-in-difference: 0.846-0.694=0.152 (the difference between poor in low and 
high inequality) and 0.873-0.612=0.216 (the difference between rich in low and high inequality). The 
difference-in-difference is 0.216-0.152=0.064. This difference is statistically significant (p<0.000), 
suggesting that the bigger change that we observe among the rich is not likely to be accidental.  
 
25 
differences are small; that the substantive differences between the willingness to fight of 
the poor and the rich are bigger when inequality is high; and that the changes between 
low and high inequality are more pronounced among the rich.  
Robustness Checks 
We conduct several robustness checks to assess whether our main findings hold 
when we use alternative measurements of inequality, and restrict our sample. The 
regression tables and the predicted probabilities are in the Appendix. Overall, these 
checks show that our results are robust to using alternative measures of inequality (LIS 
Gini index and relative redistribution rather than Gini). We also show that outliers do not 
affect our findings—the results hold when we drop various outliers. Finally—our results 
become substantively stronger when we restrict our sample to young males aged 18-45 
who reside in democratic countries.  
Explaining Our Findings 
What accounts for our findings? In the discussion above, we outline four potential 
reasons for an interactive effect of income and inequality on willingness to fight. We now 
discuss which theory is more consistent with our data.  
The first proposed explanation is that the poor become more nationalistic when 
inequality is high, making them more willing to fight than the rich.
43
 We use the WVS 
question on how proud respondents are of their nationality to test this hypothesis.
44
 
Column 1 in Table 3 presents the linear predictions of nationalistic attitudes. The data 
                                                          
43
 Shayo 2009. 
44
 The question asks how proud the respondent is to be a member of their nationality. Responses range from 
1 (very proud) to 4 (not proud at all). We reverse the scale such that higher numbers correspond to higher 
levels of pride, and rescale the responses between 0 and 1. We use an OLS model. 
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suggest that there are no statistically-significant differences between the poor and the 
rich, and that respondents from high-inequality countries express greater pride in their 
nationality than respondents from countries with low inequality. Thus, nationalistic 
sentiments cannot account for the differences between the rich and the poor, and for the 
finding that respondents from high inequality countries are less willing to fight.  
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Table 3: Alternative explanations for the findings  
 
Inequality  
 
Income 
quintile 
(1) 
Proud of 
nationality 
(2) 
War necessary to 
achieve justice 
(3) 
War likely 
 
 
 
 
Low 
Q1 0.806 (0.017) 
[0.774  0.839] 
0.300 (0.034) 
[0.233  0.367] 
0.675 (0.029) 
[0.618  0.731] 
Q2 0.809 (0.017) 
[0.776  0.841] 
0.365 (0.037) 
[0.292  0.438] 
0.561 (0.024) 
[0.514  0.608] 
Q3 0.827 (0.017) 
[0.795  0.860] 
0.367 (0.036) 
[0.296  0.437] 
0.550 (0.025) 
[0.501  0.599] 
Q4 0.824 (0.017) 
[0.790  0.858] 
0.406 (0.044) 
[0.319  0.493] 
0.515 (0.028) 
[0.461  0.570]  
Q5 0.818 (0.019) 
[0.781  0.855] 
0.488 (0.054) 
[0.383  0.594] 
0.530 (0.044) 
[0.443  0.617] 
 
 
 
 
High 
Q1 0.856 (0.020) 
[0.817  0.895] 
0.390 (0.048) 
[0.296  0.483] 
0.689 (0.034) 
[0.623  0.755] 
Q2 0.834 (0.020) 
[0.794  0.873] 
0.347 (0.042) 
[0.264  0.430] 
0.705 (0.030) 
[0.646  0.764] 
Q3 0.833 (0.020) 
[0.794  0.873] 
0.372 (0.043) 
[0.287  0.457] 
0.677 (0.031) 
[0.616  0.738] 
Q4 0.831 (0.021) 
[0.790  0.872) 
0.397 (0.057) 
[0.286 0.508] 
0.700 (0.035) 
[0.630  0.769] 
Q5 0.831 (0.024) 
[0.784  0.879] 
0.389 (0.070) 
[0.251  0.527] 
0.621 (0.053) 
[0.517  0.725] 
N (countries) 113,941 (83) 29,950 (42) 30,608 (52) 
Notes: This table reports predictions based on OLS models (Columns 1, 3) and a probit model (Column 2), with standard errors adjusted for 
within country clustering in parentheses, and 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. These results use male respondents only. All 
regressions include individual- and time-varying country-level factors. Column 1 includes country and survey fixed effects. Additional 
information about these tests and regression tables are in the Append 
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According to the second proposed mechanism, high inequality makes it more 
attractive for the rich to buy themselves out of service, and thus reduces their willingness 
to fight. When income disparities are greater, the income of the poor falls even lower 
than the average income, thereby making it cheaper for the rich to mobilize the poor.
45
 
Since mobilization costs affect both the poor and the rich, this view implies that when 
inequality changes from low to high, the predicted probability of willingness to fight 
should rise among the poor by a similar order of magnitude as it falls among the rich.  
This is not precisely what we find. In the difference-in-difference calculation above (see 
footnote 42), we show that the drop in the predicted probability of willingness to fight 
among the rich is greater than its rise among the poor. However, the mobilization cost 
explanation still holds among the rich. At the same time, it remains to be examined why 
the mobilization costs’ drop has a smaller effect on willingness to fight among the poor 
than among the rich.  
According to the third explanation, the rich may be less willing to fight when 
inequality is high because they anticipate that progressive taxation will increase in the 
aftermath of a war.
46
 This anticipated capital contribution makes them feel less obligated 
to contribute their labor. Based on the difference-in-difference calculations described 
above (footnote 42), this explanation is consistent with our data because it would explain 
why higher inequality has a stronger impact on the rich than on the poor. To further 
examine this explanation, we return to the WVS. One WVS question asks respondents 
whether, under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice. If the rich are less 
                                                          
45
 Esteban and Ray 2011; Kuhn and Weidmann 2015. 
46
 Scheve and Stasavage 2010. 
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willing to fight for their country because of post-war redistribution concerns, then we 
expect the rich in countries with high inequality to be less likely to respond affirmatively 
to this question, compared to their poorer compatriots. This logic also implies that when 
inequality is low, there should not be a significant difference between people in different 
economic strata with respect to their views on the necessity of war. In fact, that is not the 
picture that emerges from column 2 in Table 3. Rather, when inequality is high, there is 
no statistically significant difference between the rich and the poor with respect to their 
view on the necessity of war (the difference between 0.390 and 0.389 is not statistically 
significant, p>0.1). However, when inequality is low, better-off respondents are more 
likely to agree that war may be necessary (the difference between 0.300 and 0.488 is 
statistically significant, p<0.01). These findings cannot be explained by taxation 
concerns, but can be accounted for by the mobilization costs explanation.
47
 
Finally, Caverley’s theory48 implies that the poor in high-inequality democracies 
may be more willing to fight because capital-intensive militaries shield them from many 
risks of war, and the material costs of war are incurred by the rich. This view also implies 
that the poor in these countries should be more supportive of war in general. The results 
in column 2 are not consistent with this view, and thus we conclude that it cannot account 
for our findings.
49
 
                                                          
47
 The mobilization costs explanation implies that lower inequality makes it less attractive for the poor to 
join up. This can explain why the rich are more likely than the poor to agree that war may be necessary 
when inequality is low. 
48
 Caverley 2014. 
49
 When inequality is high, there is no statistically significant difference between the poor and the rich; and 
when inequality is low, the rich are more likely to say that war may be necessary to obtain justice. 
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In sum, our analysis suggests that the patterns that we identify with respect to 
willingness to fight are consistent with explanations that emphasize material 
considerations, especially for the rich in high-inequality countries. That said, 
mobilization costs do not make the poor in high-inequality countries more willing to fight 
than the poor in low-inequality countries. We also conclude that our data are not 
consistent with several other explanations that highlight the role of nationalism, 
redistribution concerns, or greater willingness to support military policies on the part of 
the poor. 
Conclusions 
We examine the joint role played by individual income and country-level inequality in 
shaping people’s willingness to take up arms for their country using representative 
national surveys alongside country-level data for dozens of countries over more than 
three decades.  
At the theoretical level, our work extends previous research on the determinants 
of individual willingness to fight for one’s country by connecting economic disparities 
with attitudes about wartime behavior. The first and perhaps most significant theoretical 
contribution of this research is the finding that the association between willingness to 
fight and respondents’ income depends on country-level income inequality. We find that 
people are less willing to fight for their country when income asymmetries are greater, 
while individual income does not have a robust relationship with willingness to fight. 
Additionally, we show that, as the distribution of income becomes more unequal, the rich 
become less willing to fight. We also find that substantive differences in willingness to 
fight between people at the opposite ends of the economic spectrum are greater when 
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inequality is high. This pattern of findings extends Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel’s 
notion of life opportunities,
50
 in that the better life opportunities that exist in low-
inequality countries are consistent with our finding that there is no difference between the 
poor and the rich in their willingness to fight when inequality is low. This means that low 
inequality—which is part of the “life opportunities” index in Ingelhart, Puranen, and 
Welzel—moderates the effect of individual income on the willingness to fight for one’s 
country—especially among your males in low inequality democratic countries. 
Conversely, when inequality is high, individual income makes a difference, with poorer 
people more willing to fight. 
Importantly, our analysis shows that the effect of inequality is stronger among the 
rich than among the poor (note the growing gap between low and high inequality in 
Figure 2 as income increases). Our explanation for this result is that inequality makes it 
cheaper to mobilize the poor, and thus reduces the willingness of the rich to fight. Poorer 
citizens, for their part, are insensitive to levels of income inequality. This may partially 
be explained by the fact that mobilization can be a route to relative upward mobility. In 
effect, by serving their country, low-income individuals gain status and recognition. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with explanations that stress material incentives and a 
cost-benefit approach, especially among wealthier citizens. We also present evidence that 
our results cannot be fully explained by several alternative approaches. 
Consistent with previous research, age, gender, and marital status have significant 
effects on willingness to fight, with greater willingness to fight among younger citizens, 
men, and married individuals. Religious affiliation, too, has a positive effect on 
                                                          
50
 Ingelhart et al.’s (2015). 
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willingness to fight in times of war. There is also no correlation between education and 
willingness to fight (in fact, the relationship is not monotonic).
51
 In line with other 
emerging work pursued in the field of willingness to fight,
52
 we found that attitudinal 
constructs, such as confidence in the government and armed forces and pride of 
nationality, significantly influence individuals' willingness to go to war. Likewise, cross-
national differences in countries’ history of military conflict also exert significant effects 
on individuals’ willingness to fight,53 such that the publics of Germany and Japan report 
low rates of willingness to fight.
54
 There is also a slightly higher percentage of those 
willing to fight in countries with conscription.
55
 Yet the substantive results of our 
analyses of six cumulative waves (1981-2013) of the World Value Survey for more than 
90 countries remained the same: the poor are slightly less likely to respond affirmatively 
than the rich when inequality is low, and they are more likely to respond affirmatively 
than the rich when inequality is high. 
It should be noted that our main results hold when we restrict our sample to males 
in democracies. In non-democracies, there are no statistically significant differences 
between poorer and wealthier respondents. This makes sense if willingness to fight is 
driven by future expectation of benefits, in that such benefits are less likely in non-
democracies. This finding is consistent with Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel’s notion of 
life opportunities.      
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 Inglehart et al. 2015; Puranen 2014. 
52
 Díez-Nicolás 2009; Puranen 2014; Torgler 2003. 
53
 Alderman 2015; Braw 2015; Pazes et al. 2007. 
54
 Inglehart et al. 2015. 
55
 Horowitz and Levendusky 2011. 
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Our findings also have an important normative implication, in that greater income 
inequality may be associated with unequally shared burdens when it comes to the 
provision of labor for war efforts. If our findings are reflected in people’s actual behavior, 
the inescapable conclusion is that inequality begets less shared sacrifice. 
These results speak to a variety of challenges that states must confront in 
defending themselves or their interests in the face of growing inequality, especially in an 
age when the military is increasingly high-tech, and therefore reliant on better-educated, 
highly skilled soldiers (who tend to come from better-off backgrounds). As those who are 
well-off become more apathetic, the ability of states to maintain a modern and well-
prepared military may be undermined. Moreover, while wealthier citizens may be less 
likely to serve, they nonetheless make up the majority of those in positions of power – 
those who ultimately make decisions on when and where to go to war.  
All in all, while much attention has been placed on the need to address growing 
income inequality, the focus is often on the economic consequences of inequality for 
those with less – and their implications for health care, education, and other aspects of 
public welfare and civil life. The results of this paper suggest that states should be attuned 
to the possibility that greater income inequality also results in an increasingly asymmetric 
distribution of risk within society, by influencing decision-making on the part of the rich 
when it comes to who goes to war. 
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